Over the last years, dynamic and static malware analysis techniques have made significant progress. Majority of the existing analysis systems primarily focus on internal host activity. In spite of the importance of network activity, only a limited set of analysis tools have recently started taking it into account.
Introduction
Over the last years, techniques to gather and analyze malware, dynamically or statically, have made significant progress. Dynamic malware analysis is the process of analyzing a specific execution path of malware by observing its execution in a controlled environment that is as realistic as possible. It contrasts with static analysis, where all execution paths are simultaneously studied through simulated execution.
One of the primary functions of malware analysis is to help researchers and anti-virus vendors determine whether newly gathered malware samples are new variants of known malware or they seem to exhibit new behavior and characteristics that were not previously observed.
While earlier analysis systems primarily focused on analysis of internal host activity, newer versions tend to include a more and more detailed analysis of the network activity. For example, Norman Sandbox [13] , CWSandbox [19] , and Anubis [3] now all include raw network traffic capture functionalities. However, in spite of these recent developments the value network activity analysis is still mostly neglected.
In this paper, we focus on the analysis of network activity exhibited by malware. More precisely, our focus is on comparing malware samples from the point of view of the network activity that is recorded during their execution in the dynamic analysis phase. We do not suggest that malware samples should be compared one with another using network activity instead of internal host activity. Rather, we ask the following question: How well can we classify malware according to network activity? As more and more malware evades internal host activity monitoring by detecting the various analysis tools that are used by the cyber security community, we believe that monitoring malware execution from outside the host, i.e. from the network, is a technique that should be an essential constituent of a complete toolkit. In addition, there might be field scenarios where no binary executables have been captured, and all the analyst has at hand is a network traffic capture file. In situations like this, to be able to compare this file with network traffic that has been generated upon execution of known malware should prove to be useful.
In this work we approach malware classification from the perspective of network activity observed at the application layer. More specifically, we would like to see whether using our approach we are able to produce malware groupings similar to those provided by antivirus scanners. We monitor the execution of a malware sample in a controlled environment and summarize the obtained high-level information in a network activity graph. We then analyze malware samples according to their graphs. In this analysis we employ a graph distance measure based on maximal common subgraph. Our experimental study on a real-world malware collection demonstrates that our approach is able to group malware samples that behave similarly.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents related work. Section 3 describes the details of the proposed approach. Evaluation results are presented in Section 4 and finally Section 5 concludes with the paper.
Related Work
While earlier efforts relied on static analysis (see Gheorghescu et al. [8] for an exhaustive review of this approach), more recent advances mostly rely on dynamic analysis (also called runtime analysis).
To the best of our knowledge, Lee and Mody [11] were the first to attempt a behavioral approach to malware classification. Through a controlled virtual environment they captured internal hosts events that were then clustered using a variant of the Levenshtein Distance, also known as the string edit distance.
As opposed to looking at low level behavior (e.g. system calls), Bailey et al. [1] proposed a clustering method that relied on the computation of a fingerprint based on the concept of state change. The idea of abstracting the low level behavior for malware analysis has been also employed in other studies.
Rieck et al. [15] looked into machine learning to discriminate malware belonging to known families from new malware. In this they relied on the behavioral profiles extracted using CWSandbox, and translated into high-dimensional vectors. In [16] , Rieck et al. [16] extended this idea by combining clustering and classification methods in an incremental algorithm, which requires much less running time and memory than previous approaches.
Bayer et al. [2] addressed the clustering scalability problem caused by the fact that computing distances between all pairs of n malware samples requires a running time of Ω(n 2 ). Based on the initial analysis reports extracted using the Anubis system, they computed malware distances using Locality Sensitive Hashing technique, which computes a probabilistic estimate of all near pairs, thus avoiding an expensive computation of all distances.
While the above studies primarily work with system events, Wehner [18] studied the possibility of using Normalized Compression Distance (NCD) to raw network traffic capture files in order to develop intrusion detection signatures. Although no thorough evaluation of this idea was provided, preliminary results were promising.
John et al. [9] looked at the malware network behavior from the perspective of spamming botnets. Their primary concern was not to cluster malware samples, but rather how to identify redundant malware samples. For this they developed a concept of network fingerprint (a 4-tuple <protocol,IP address, DNS address, port>) and computed a similarity coefficient based on the proportion of flows that were common within network fingerprints.
More recently, Perdisci et al. [14] proposed a clusteringbased method for generating Intrusion Detection System (IDS) signatures for HTTP-based malware.
Generally, each of these approaches is characterized by 1. the way the original analysis report is generated, 2. the distance function that is used to compare samples one with another, 3. the process that is used to select which pairs of samples should be compared, and 4. the algorithm that is used to group samples into families.
The two last items represent a mostly algorithmic challenge that pertains to data mining, while the first one is really a matter of obtaining a precise analysis report. The second point relates to the problem that should be considered separately. Essentially, the more precise the analysis, the better the classification will be, regardless of how the three last items are performed. Thus in this work we focus on the second item.
Approach Overview
In spite of the importance of network activity and the insight it can bring into understanding of malware behavior, the majority of malware analysis tools do not take into account this activity. The goal of this work is to investigate the behavior of malware samples from the point of view of the network activity. That is we ask the following question: How well can we classify malware according to network activity?
In this analysis, we follow the multi-step process that includes the initial dynamic analysis of malware samples, the subsequent extraction of high-level network information and generation of network graphs, and final analysis of graphs similarity.
Dynamic analysis
The success of the network analysis depends on whether the malware is able to perform functions it was programmed to do or not. For this work the malware samples were executed in a network sandbox, called the AES (Automatic Experimentation System) [5, 6] . The AES supports the execution of malware in a customized virtual network. It is clear that, technically speaking, malware execution in a network that is not connected to the Internet will most likely produce less information than if an Internet connection was allowed. However, for ethical, political, or legal reasons many organizations choose not to use the Internet or would only resolve to do so in case of extreme necessity. Therefore, it is desirable to develop techniques that allow to extract as much information as possible from malware sample without providing it with Internet access. Prior to execution, the IP addresses that a given malware sample may attempt to contact are unknown. One strategy that the AES implements to address this problem is to reduce the Internet IP address space to the IP addresses of a small number of hosts that are in an isolated network. This allows to emulate Internet connectivity and re-route traffic requiring external communication to the designated servers that act on behalf of the requested services (see [5, 6] for details). For example, DNS traffic is forwarded to a Linux host running a custom DNS emulation script. We acknowledge that the virtual environment used by the AES is detectable by malware. However, we argue that since we aim to determine how two different malware samples are similar to each other, as long as we execute them both within the same environment, being detected by malware is not an issue.
Thus, using AES we execute malware samples and capture the generated network traffic in tcpdump 1 (pcap) format using tshark 2 . The pcap files are then parsed through network analysis tools to extract necessary information. Since we are primarily interested in high-level abstraction, in this work we focus on application layer protocols (HTTP, SMTP, FTP, DNS, IRC). To decode application layer protocols, we employed tshark, for most protocols, except SMTP, that we parsed using Scapy 3 . For these protocols, we extract all readable payload information.
Network activity graphs
Once the malware samples are executed and high-level information is extracted, the next step is to summarize the obtained information. In order to do this, we introduce the concept of network activity graphs. We model application level protocols as graph's nodes and the commonalities between them as edges.
The activity generated by malware samples at the network level is often repetitive, therefore it is necessary to summarize it in a concise and consistent manner. For example, some botnet malware is known to periodically produce several identical HTTP requests. As such, these repetitive individual requests do not carry any additional information and hence can be combined and treated as a single graph node.
The graph edges represent commonalities between the graph nodes. For example, an email address in an SMTP flow is the same as the nickname used in an IRC communication. Since the ordering of network operations is often
Definition Given a traffic trace t, the network activity graph of t, denoted g(t), is the attributed graph defined by a triple g(t) = (V, E, φ), where V is a set of vertices corresponding to network flows in t, φ is a function that assigns sets of attributes of the application layer protocol to elements of V , and there is an edge e = (u, v) ∈ E if an only if φ(u) ∩ φ(v) = ∅ (i.e., u and v have some application layer attribute in common). In addition, for each edge e = (u, v) ∈ E, ψ(e) is defined as φ(u) ∩ φ(v) (i.e., ψ is a function that labels edges with the corresponding commonality).
Note that for our application, application layer attributes do not need to be labeled, i.e. only the attribute values are being used. For example, in an SMTP flow, the source and destination e-mail addresses of an e-mail being sent are not differentiated from each other, these two addresses are both in the attribute set of that flow. In Section 4, we show that such high-level behavior description is sufficient to provide accurate classification of malware samples.
Graph Similarity Analysis
Once the network activity graphs are generated, the next step is to compute graphs similarity. We evaluate the graphs similarity using a graph measure, introduced by Bunke and Shearer [4] , that aims to assess the distance between graphs based on the maximal common substructure of two graphs.
Definition Given two graphs g 1 = (V 1 , E 1 , φ 1 ) and g 2 = (V 2 , E 2 , φ 2 ), a common subgraph of g 1 and g 2 is a graph g = (V, E, φ) such that there exist two injective functions,
, and for each e = (u, v) ∈ E, M 1 (e) ∈ E 1 , M 2 (e) ∈ E 2 , and ψ 1 (M 1 (e)) ∩ ψ 2 (M 2 (e)) = ∅. 4 A maximal common subgraph mcs(g 1 , g 2 ) is a common subgraph g such that there exists no other common subgraph having more nodes than g.
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Note that since M 1 and M 2 are injective, |E| ≤ max(|E 1 |, |E 2 |).
Given the similarity of nodes, the similarity of edges is computed by matching the value of all application layer attributes of the corresponding nodes. Specifically, we aim to capture the similarity between any string attributes of the application layer. The exact matching in this case is too restrictive and will not capture the similarity between, for example, a DNS request for domain "gmail-smtp-in.l.google.com" and the SMTP email "infected@gmail.com".
As such we turn to an approximate string matching. Since we are interested in lexical similarity of two attributes we employ a longest common substring (lcs) algorithm that estimates the longest contiguous sequence of characters that exists in both attributes. The longer the matching substring, the better the similarity score between the two attributes. Thus if two attributes match exactly, their similarity score will be 1. Formally, the similarity score sim between two attributes a 1 and a 2 is defined as
Given the above definition of similarity between two attributes, given two graphs g 1 = (V 1 , E 1 , φ 1 ) and g 2 = (V 2 , E 2 , φ 2 ) and their maximal common subgraph g = (V, E, φ), we define their distance as follows:
where w(g) is the total weight of the maximal common subgraph, defined as
In general, the higher the distance the more dissimilar two graphs are. Since 0 ≤ d(g 1 , g 2 ) ≤ 1, in the case when two graphs are identical their distance will be equal to 0.
The graph similarity measure employed in this work, as well as other metrics based on computing common substructures, is associated with high computational cost. In general, the cost of computing the maximum common subgraph, in the worst case, is exponential in the number of nodes. However, our approach based on high-level characteristics of network activity makes the use of this distance metric feasible. Since the graphs present a summary of the unique behavior observed at the application layer, the size of the constructed graphs is generally small (in the order of 10s). Moreover, the d(g 1 , g 2 ) = d(g 2 , g 1 ) thus computation of all pairwise distances is not necessary. As the future work, computational complexity problem can be addressed using heuristic techniques that offer more robust solution [12, 7] .
Case Study
Data and Setup The main focus of our work is to evaluate the value of network activity for malware classification by various antivirus products. More specifically, we would like to see whether using our approach we are able to produce malware groupings similar to those provided by antivirus scanners.
One of the common options for demonstrating the effectiveness of a method and the correctness of the produced groupings is with the use of reference clustering. Since such malware reference set does not exist, the researchers generally resort to creating one of their own. This however, is a challenging task. It requires a great deal of time and expertise. As was noted by [2] , the labels assigned by different antivirus scanners to the same malware variants are often inconsistent. Thus the use of reference clustering requires a manual mapping between the labels of different antivirus products to make sure the generated clusters agree with the antivirus labels.
Since the main premise of our experiments is to analyze the behavior of our method with respect to the malware labels provided by individual antivirus scanners, in our experimental study we employ statistical validation that does not require mapping between labels.
Specifically, we depart from the following fundamental assumption: if our network activity graph based method provides a sufficient measure for comparing malware samples then we should observe significant statistical difference in the graph similarity distances between malware families formed according to the labels provided by antivirus scanners.
We evaluate our network activity based method as follows:
1. For each antivirus scanner we break the malware samples into groups according to the labels assigned by an antivirus. Note that although we refer to groups as malware families we in fact use the full av labels that combine malware family and the variant names. This gives our analysis a more narrow focus. 2. We analyze the difference in graph similarity distances between groups and within each of these groups using the analysis of variance (ANOVA) and F -statistic that is commonly used to determine whether the differences are statistically significant. 3. We test the significance of these differences. In practice, ANOVA tests are usually interpreted with the probability distribution of F -statistic commonly reported as a single value of significance of a test, or pV alue. The value of confidence interval is used to interpret the significance of each of the estimated F values. For example for 99% confidence level when we observe that pV alue ≤ .01, this indicates that the probability that groups in ANOVA test are all equal (i.e, there is no difference between graph distances in different groups) is 1% or less. We treat these results as a sufficient evidence that in fact these groups are not equal. Within our method validation framework this serves a statistically justified indication that our method successfully distinguishes between different malware families and confirms that distances within a malware family agree with the antivirus labeling.
In our experiments we used a corpus of 25118 malware samples that were provided to us by Paul Royal, Georgia Institute of Technology, USA 6 . We executed each sample in the AES environment for a period of 1 minute and scanned each malware sample with the following antivirus scanners: Avast! Anti-Virus v. Table 1 .
To overcome some inherited limitations of our data we applied bootstrap rationale. Specifically, there were substantial number of cases in our data set that have shown no variability within groups (see Table 2 ), i.e., the distance between malware graphs was equal to 0 or in other words the graphs of malware samples within these groups were identical. Since ANOVA procedure requires existence of variability within groups, we randomly sampled our data set generating 100 rounds with 100 malware samples that meet the indicated criteria in each round and run ANOVA for each of the rounds. Table 1 . Protocol distribution in the employed data set.
Results We started our experiments with analysis of the malware families formed according to labels assigned by different antiviruses. The summary of the statistics for the data set is shown in Table 2 . Although the data set includes a large number of unique malware families, the majority of them are not suitable for any type of analysis as they are only represented with one sample. Note that samples that were not recognized by av scanners were not included in the analysis. As such, the AVG scanner recognized 9926 unique malware families within the given data set, however less than 5% of them (445) were suitable for the experiments. Table 2 also shows an average distance within a family and an average standard deviation (stdDev) of distances.
This basically characterizes the compactness of the malware families according to the graph similarity distances computed using network activity. Low distance values within a family indicate that the malware samples within that family are similar, or rather the network behavior generated by these samples is similar. A low standard deviation value, on the other hand, implies that these distances are close and there is no much variation within this group. Thus ideally, we would like to see malware families with low average distance and stdDev values. Among the analyzed av scanners, we can note Panda scanner and NOD32. Panda scanner reports the lowest average distance and stdDev values, while NOD32 has the highest values. These positions are supported by the amount of families with no variability among distances within a group. As labeled by NOD32 17% of families have var = 0. This indicates that the majority of families contain samples which distance values are not the same. This might indicate that these samples have dissimilar behavior. However, the further ANOVA tests and manual analysis of the results show that such average distance and stdDev values for NOD32 are due to several families that significantly deviate from the rest, thus inflating these parameters. Table 3 presents the distribution of pV alues for each of the av scanners. Ideally we would like the majority of ANOVA runs to give pV alue close to zero. In our analysis we report values for confidence level of 100%, 99%, 95% and 90%. As the results show the majority of the ANOVA runs produce the pV alue = 0 which indicates that the malware groups within that run are different, i.e., the graph similarity distances within the group are similar and at the same time significantly different from the distances in other groups.
One observation that our study unveils is potential difficulty in choosing a threshold to differentiate families. Very often the studies on malware behavior introduce methods that require the use of a threshold to determine similarity of malware samples. As the results in Table 2 show choosing a value that would appropriately differentiate between families is challenging. As different av scanners and different malware families have different variability of distances, choosing a threshold that will be universally applicable is nearly impossible. More practical approach could be using a tuning mechanism based on a specific antivirus scanner and potentially a type of malware family.
Conclusion
In this work we presented an approach to the analysis of malware samples based on their network activity. Our method focuses on the high-level information extracted from application layer attributes and allows to group malware samples that behave similarly on the network level. Table 3 . Distribution of pV alue.
Our experimental study on 25118 malware samples confirms that using this high-level network information is a sufficient measure for comparing malware samples.
